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*Prinzipien der Erkenntnislehre: Prolegomena zur absoluten Metaphysik.*  
 Von BRANISLAV PETRONIEVICS. Berlin, Ernst Hoffman und Co.,  
 1900.—pp. vi, 134.

The purpose of this book is to show the possibility of absolute metaphysics. After Kant's repudiation of metaphysics the Post-Kantian idealists tried to establish it upon a new basis. That this basis was wrong is proved by the fact that their theories conflict with experience. The author believes that it is possible to work out a metaphysical system which rests upon experience, and is in harmony with it, and that this is possible because experience itself contains the source of transcendent knowledge.

Dr. Petronievics starts with the 'immediately given,' *i. e.*, the consciousness of the individual. "The absolute reality of this consciousness both in its contents and in its form is the absolute presupposition of the possibility of a theory of knowledge." But what is immediately given is only the consciousness of the present indivisible moment. My present existence is given in the consciousness of the moment, but how is it that I can go beyond this and postulate my past and my future existence? This problem of the "temporal transcendence of the Ego," which Dr. Petronievics raises, and upon the importance of which he rightly insists, forms the subject of one of the most interesting discussions in the book. It is hardly possible to reproduce the argument in the brief space at our command. The solution of the problem, however, is found in the fact that the immediately given has two aspects—a temporal and a timeless one. The conscious content changes; but the form of consciousness, the perceiving function, is itself a timeless principle; and since it is just as truly given as the content is—though in a different way—we are justified in using it to establish the temporal transcendence of the Ego. This timeless Ego must be a real essence: if it were simply the formal unity of the conscious content, it would share in the temporal nature of that content.

Just as the author tries to explain the temporal transcendence of the Ego by reference to the form of consciousness, so he appeals to the will to solve the problem of 'spatial transcendence'—*i. e.*, the problem of the external world. I posit a world of objects because I find changes in my conscious states of which I know that I am not the cause. But in order that this knowledge may be possible, I must be immediately conscious, with regard to other states, that I am their cause. And this requirement is fulfilled; we know immediately "that the movements which we will, happen only because we will them. Thus experience itself establishes the absolute reality of the will, and through this we are assured of the absolute reality of the external world. Further, since every ultimate cause must be a will, this external world is a system of wills. But although immediate experience guarantees the absolute reality of the content of consciousness, the form of consciousness, the will, and the external world, yet the relation to experience is not the same in all these

cases. The content of consciousness is wholly immanent. The form is half immanent and half transcendent, is given and yet not as conscious content. The activity of will is immanent, is immediately given in consciousness. But the will itself, as an essence, is wholly transcendent, is reached only by a process of reasoning, just as the existence of the external world is. Moreover, we seem to need a third essence, still more transcendent, to serve as a bond of union between the perceiving function and the willing function. We must assume a "simple unchangeable substance, which unites the two essences and forms their ground." It is more fully transcendent than the will-function; for consciousness reveals no activity corresponding to it. The nature of this substance and its relation to will and consciousness belong, however, to metaphysics rather than to epistemology.

Dr. Petronievics anticipates in his Preface the criticism which is most likely to be passed upon his book, viz., that his 'immediately given' contains much which to many of his readers seems to demand proof. A further criticism which may be made is that there seems to be a rather unwarrantable multiplication of essences in the individual Ego. The form of consciousness is an essence; the will is another; and behind these two is a third, the unchangeable substance. Perhaps, however, the insistence that the perceiving function and the willing function are essences (*Wesen, Wesenheiten*) is not to be taken quite literally. The author's meaning may be more accurately expressed when he speaks of them as "attributes of substance." It should be noted also, in justice to Dr. Petronievics, that he postpones the discussion of the relations between these attributes and the substance. The proof-reading on the book seems not to have been done very carefully; the number of misprints is considerable.

ELLEN BLISS TALBOT.

*Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles. Zweiter Teil, Die Logische Theorie des Syllogismus und die Entstehung der Aristotelischen Logik: Zweite Hälfte, Die Entstehung der Aristotelischen Logik.* Von HEINRICH MAIER. Tübingen, H. Laupp, 1900.—pp. vii, 408.

In a brief preface the author announces that this volume concludes, for the present, his investigations of the Aristotelian logic. He is not now prepared to say when the projected final volume of his work will appear, as he purposes for a time to address himself to other tasks. The two earlier instalments of his treatise were briefly noticed in this REVIEW, Vol. VI, pp. 439 ff., and Vol. IX, pp. 548 ff.

The volume before us is divided into three chapters. The first treats of the genesis of the theory of the syllogism. Here Dr. Maier briefly but lucidly sketches the antecedents of the syllogism, particularly the eristic logic-chopping of the 5th and 4th centuries B. C., and the Platonic dialectic. He then proceeds to show how Aristotle's mastery of method